what is involved in actual choices as they are presented and as they work out.
lt is also that almost any choice or line of action tends to continue to include some and exclude others: one person's need for technological improvement is another person's exclusion from customary employment. There are also problems in institutional action:
it is difficult to include and integrate existing and particular concerns within an overall programme of research, planning and administration. A slogan to "Feed, Clothe, House" the nation (as in Guyana after 1973) comes to mean (via import controls) an assault on the customary, deeply entrenched and (in that sense at least) basic diet of one community rather than another. The provision of basic shelter through self-help housing excludes those who cannot meet conditions of residence, employment, stability and physical inputs. This becomes part of the explanation of the whole problem. Let us look first of all at thc reality of such choices. The question then is in part the meaning and appeal of what is basic. We can examine two instances in which this was faced. One example was the Third Indian Public Service Pay Commission which made a specific effort to calculate the minimum subsistence needs of a peon as the base grade of the service, cost the basket and structure the whole classification system accordingly. The difliculty was, apparently, that it would have put the base grade at too high a level on which to build up the pyramid of relativities and advancement which a public service is supposed to require. Preparatory and post-colonial services were already flattening these pyramids', as the extreme racial distinctions and favouritism of colonial administration were, to an extent, removed.
There had, it seemed, to be a limit, or so it was 1964. The then colonial (Liberal Country, viz. conservative) Australian administration was explicitly in favour of what we might now recognise as a basic needs strategy: "broadening the base by the establishment of new schools"; viz, covering the whole country with at least a minimum of formal education. The Bank recommended the opposite choice: "making the full course available in existing schools"; a deliberately exclusive, or as its critics said, elitist strategy2. The Bank called this its "principle of concentration", which may be taken as an appropriate label for the case against basic needs To say, however, that such choices have sometimes been 'real' is not the end of the matter. There are two other features to be looked at. The first concerns the ways in which a choice in favour of basic needs could be conservative, with all that implies. That is to say, it might well strengthen the forces keeping intact or preserving a system as it is. Either 'concentration', as in one case, or 'sustaining differentials', as in the other, could be interpreted as instruments of change. The opposite is, indeed, perhaps a reinforcement of what is felt to be entrenched, customary, deeply structured, profoundly held or possessed. An expression of basic need, in so far as it implies a 'right' (that is an effectively recognised claim) is in the strict sense of the word tending to the ineluctable: a highly seventeenth century notion, Lockeian, later Jeffersonian. I do not rehearse here the degree to which that sort of perception has been revolutionary or reactionary. The record is complex; our interpretation is never disinterested. in Ghana. 1946 Ghana. -60, 1964 progressive farmer; but should we not attempt to channel aid directly to the rural poor, and so on. However, the difficulty is then to recruit aids to rational calculation which will provide quantifications of these other welfare considerations which are to be taken into account. The force of any political recruitment, however, in favour of the case for the basic and the excluded, (as against hierarchy, differentials, the concentrated and the 'progressive') might well be widespread precisely to the degree to which it represents or voices what is basic politics: has, that is to say, a necessary element of the populist, as cost benefit analysis has of the individualistic. To that extent, the populism of a Hence, in basic needs programmes, it is above all essential to consider these distributive problems: but how is that to be done? But that is not to say that a choice or concern for basic needs is unreal. We have argued that it is real but complex. In particular, a basic human needs strategy means nothing unless it faces these problems of distribution and allocation, of inclusion as against exclusion, which excite the concern in the first place. (Patnaik 1972 : Alavi 1975 .
